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ABSTRACT
Split manufacturing (SM) seeks to protect against piracy of intel-
lectual property (IP) in chip designs. Here we propose a scheme to
manipulate both placement and routing in an intertwined manner,
thereby increasing the resilience of SM layouts. Key stages of our
scheme are to (partially) randomize a design, place and route the
erroneous netlist, and restore the original design by re-routing the
BEOL. Based on state-of-the-art proximity attacks, we demonstrate
that our scheme notably excels over the prior art (i.e., 0% correct
connection rates). Our scheme induces controllable PPA overheads
and lowers commercial cost (the latter by splitting at higher layers).
1 INTRODUCTION
Proposed in 2011 by the IARPA agency, split manufacturing (SM)
seeks to protect chip design companies against piracy of their in-
tellectual property (IP) by third-party manufacturing facilities [1].
SM can also help to mitigate related threats such as insertion of
hardware Trojans or unauthorized over-manufacturing [2].
In the most common threat model [3–9], the front-end-of-line
(FEOL) is handled by an outsourced, high-end fab which is consid-
ered competitive but untrustworthy, whereas the back-end-of-line
(BEOL) is subsequently manufactured (on top of the FEOL) at a
trusted integration facility. Besides, Wang et al. [10] addressed an-
other threat model where the BEOL facility is untrusted; here the
adversaries seek to infer the gates from the whole BEOL stack (i.e.,
all wires/vias are available, except the intra-cell wiring in M1).
The security promise of SM is based on two assumptions: (i) third-
party manufacturers do not have access to the complete design
but only to either FEOL or BEOL and (ii) those third parties are
not colluding. For the conventional threat model (untrusted FEOL
fab), there is an additional risk: adversaries in the fab can lever-
age the physical implementation details of the FEOL layout. More
specifically, since design automation tools optimize for power, per-
formance, and area (PPA), the FEOL part itself contains various
hints on the missing BEOL interconnects. Most importantly, gates
to be connected are typically placed close to each other. This hint
on proximity (among others such as delay constraints or routing
paths) is leveraged by various proximity attacks [3, 5–7, 9], raising
concerns regarding the security promise offered by SM.
In this work, we “raise the game” for SM to protect against mali-
cious fab adversaries. The fundamental idea is to manipulate both
placement and routing in an intertwined, holistic and misleading
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manner, thereby increasing the resilience of FEOL layouts. More
specifically, we randomize the design at the netlist level, place and
route the resulting erroneous netlist, and restore the true function-
ality only in the BEOL. This paper can be summarized as follows:
• We initially review state-of-the-art proximity attacks, re-
lated metrics, prior protection schemes, and associated short-
comings (Sec. 2). We also outline how our concept can mis-
lead proximity attacks, to begin with, even for attacks that
presumably achieve perfect scores (Sec. 3).
• We propose and implement (in Cadence Innovus) a protection
scheme for SM (Sec. 4). Our scheme is based on holistic place-
ment and routing perturbation in the FEOL and subsequent
correction in the BEOL. The scheme allows for controllable
impact on PPA. Moreover, we can limit the commercial cost
of SM, by splitting after higher layers (e.g., after M6).
• We design custom correction cells for our scheme. These cells
allow us to handle wire detours in a well-controlled manner,
which is essential to (i) induce misleading placement and
routing in the FEOL and (ii) restore the true functionality
later on by re-routing in the BEOL.
• We evaluate our scheme in terms of PPA cost and security
(Sec. 5). We consider various benchmarks, including the in-
dustrial IBM superblue benchmarks. We thoroughly contrast
with prior art. We also make our DRC-clean protected lay-
outs and SM scripts available to the community, along with
the library definitions for the correction cells [11].
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Wang et al. [5] proposed an advanced proximity attack which uti-
lizes multiple hints from the FEOL layouts: (i) physical proximity of
gates, (ii) avoidance of combinatorial loops, (iii) constraints on load
capacitances, (iv) direction of “dangling wires”1, and (v) timing
constraints. Magaña et al. [6, 7] proposed different attack schemes,
whereupon they empirically observe that attacks considering rout-
ing paths/utilization are more effective than placement-centric at-
tacks. They also observe that the IBM superblue suite is considerably
more challenging to attack than “traditional,” small-scale bench-
marks. Note that their attacks do not recover actual netlists, but
only list possible candidates for each net to reconnect.
Key attack metrics, as discussed in [3, 5, 12], are the Hamming
distance (HD), the correct connection rate (CCR), and the output error
rate (OER). The HD quantifies the mismatch between the outputs
of an original and the outputs of a recovered/stolen netlist during
test stimulation. An HD of 0% (or 100%) denotes attack success. The
1There are metal segments left open/unconnected in the topmost FEOL layer, namely
where the vias connecting upward to the BEOL are to be placed. These metal segments
are referred to as “dangling wires.” Moreover, we refer to the locations for those vias
connecting with the BEOL as virtual pins (vpins), as in [6, 7].
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
09
13
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 J
un
 20
18
DAC ’18, June 24–29, 2018, San Francisco, CA, USA S. Patnaik et al.
CCR is the ratio of successfully recovered nets over all protected
nets. Hence, the higher the CCR, the more effective the attack. The
OER reflects on the probability of some output bits being incorrect
when stimulating the recovered/stolen netlist with test patterns.
The routing-centric metrics proposed in [6, 7] gauge the solution
space of SM. The number of vpins counts the overall vias/pins in the
topmost FEOL layer (which are to be reconnected); the candidate
list size is the average number of nets to consider for each vpin;
and the match in list reflects for how many vpins the correct net is
among those in the candidate list.2 Thus, while the related attacks
help to carefully confine the solution space of SM, they can only be
considered as a complementary stage for other attacks.
Prior art [3, 5–10, 12] proposes differentmeasures to render FEOL
layouts resilient against proximity attacks. For example, Wang et
al. [5] as well as Sengupta et al. [8] perturb the placement of gates.
However, in [5, 8] it has been shown that splitting after higher
layers—which is essential to limit the commercial cost of SM [13]—
can undermine the protection. Interestingly, to some degree, this
even holds true when layout randomization is applied [8]. Such
limitation of placement-centric schemes is due to the fact that any
placement perturbation is eventually resolved by routing.
Routing-centric protection schemes like those in [3, 6, 7, 9, 12]
are typically post-processing the original layouts and thus sub-
ject to constraints in routing resources and PPA budgets. Hence,
such schemes can be limited to relatively few and/or short wiring
detours, which may be easy to attack. For example, Rajendran et
al. [3] propose to swap the pins of IP modules and reroute them to
mislead an attacker. Since the related perturbations only cover the
system-level interconnects, this scheme (i) cannot protect against
gate-level IP piracy and (ii) imposes a relatively small solution
space for the attacker. As reported in [3] itself, on average 87% of
the connections can still be recovered. Besides, enforcing routing
detours in the BEOL requires customizing the design flow, which
itself can be challenging. For example, the schemes in [6, 7] only
allow for implicit detours, namely by inserting routing blockages.
3 OUR CONCEPT (UNDER ATTACK)
Unlike most prior art which manipulates the placement and/or
routing at the layout level in a post-processing manner, our concept
targets on the netlist itself—namely by partially randomizing it.
This helps us retain the misleading modifications throughout any
regular design flow, thereby obtaining more resilient FEOL layouts.
These layouts are corrected only in the BEOL (Fig. 1). Next, we
outline how our concept misleads state-of-the-art attack schemes.
We confirm our intuition in Sec. 5.2, where we report on superior
values for key security metrics.
Any attack—even when perfect recovery rates are presumed—is
bound to observe logic and timing paths of the erroneous netlist.
Regarding the attack proposed by Wang et al. [5], the physical
2Consider the following example, where an attacker observes 1,000 vpins. In accordance
with [6], also consider that only two-pin nets are available in the design, i.e., 500 two-
pin nets are to be reconnected. The size of the solution space covering all possible
netlists is the number of perfect matchings in a complete bipartite graph (representing
the 500 drivers and 500 sinks), which is simply 500! = 1.22× 101143 . After conducting
the routing-centric attacks, assuming the best possible match in list (i.e., 100%) and a
candidate list size of 1.4 on average, there are at most “only” ≈ 1.4500 = 1.16 × 1073
possible netlists remaining. (This number is coincidentally approaching the estimated
number of atoms in the universe.) It is important to note that for any match in list
below 100%, the true netlist is not even covered by that large number.
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Figure 1: The original netlist is randomized, to N1 (D1 driv-
ing S1 and S1’), N2, etc. We place and route the erroneous
design, resulting in a FEOL layout which is misleading re-
garding both placement and routing. Next, we restore the
true functionality through the BEOL by rerouting; now D1
is driving S2, D2 is driving S1’, etc. (The driver for sinks S1
and S3 is not illustrated in this conceptional figure.)
proximity of gates, the load and timing constraints, as well as the
direction of dangling wires are all capturing the erroneous netlist,
not the original one. For example, a large buffer such as BUFX8 typ-
ically hints that its sink(s) is/are relatively far away. In the original
netlist, however, this buffer may actually drive some nearby sink(s).
As for the routing-centric attack in [6], we note that randomizing
the netlist helps to enlarge the solution space significantly when
compared to the original layouts (and even when compared to naive
lifting, Sec. 5.2). This will naturally hinder any subsequent attacks
(again, which are yet to be demonstrated).
We shall assume that the attacker knows the principle of our
protection scheme; hence she/he expects misleading FEOL layouts.
Without the BEOL disclosed to her/him, however, a naive attacker
can arguably only resort to brute-force, i.e., enumerating all possi-
ble netlists, which is computationally prohibitive (Sec. 2). A more
sophisticated attacker may seek to exclude “unreasonable” logic
and timing paths arising due to randomization. Doing so, however,
is subject to (i) significant experience on layout design, (ii) the size
and the (yet unknown) scope of the original netlist, and (iii) the
“degree of unreasonableness” of paths, which is random. We believe
that such attacks are an open but interesting challenge.
4 METHODOLOGY
Our methodology is implemented as an extension to Cadence In-
novus with custom in-house scripts and library customization. The
steps can be summarized as follows: we (i) randomize the netlist,
(ii) place and route the erroneous and misleading netlist, and (iii)
restore the true functionality by re-routing in the BEOL (Fig. 2).
Next, we provide some details. For (i), we iteratively random-
ize the netlist by swapping the connectivity between randomly
selected pairs of drivers and their sinks.3 While doing so, we ensure
that no combinatorial loops arise in the modified netlist by any of
the random swaps—loops would help an attacker to identify those
modifications [5]. We perform swapping until the OER approaches
3In case the netlist imposes some alignment constraints, e.g., for datapaths, the related
gates have to be ignored for randomization.
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Figure 2: The flow of our protection scheme.
100%, which means that the modified netlist will induce some er-
rors for any input. We also keep track of the original connectivity
and the swapped drivers/sinks. For (ii), the randomized netlist is
loaded into Cadence Innovus. Initially, the swapped drivers/sinks
are marked as do not touch to avoid logic restructuring/removal of
the related nets. The netlist is then placed and optimized for timing,
power, and congestion. Before routing, the nets connecting the
swapped drivers/sinks are prepared for lifting to M6 (or M8) with
the help of customized correction cells. Note that these correction
cells are not impacting the FEOL layout; their scope is lifting and
correction of nets in the BEOL (see also below). Next, the design
is placed and routed again in ECO mode, to implement lifting of
the swapped nets. For (iii), the true connectivity is restored in the
BEOL with the help of the correction cells and the tracked original
connectivity. The design is rerouted and taken through postRoute
optimization to improve timing and resolve DRC issues. In case the
PPA budget is not expended yet, we repeat the steps to introduce
more randomization. Otherwise, we remove the correction cells,
and export DEF/Verilog files for further layout/security analysis.
Key points for the physical design of correction cells are given
next. We provide our cell implementation on top of the Nangate
45nm library in [11]. Figure 3 illustrates our cells.
• The correction cells are modeled as 2-input-2-output OR
gates; C, D are input pins, and Y, Z are output pins.
• There are four possible arcs (C to Y, C to Z, D to Y, and D
to Z). The arc C to Z is used to implement the erroneous
netlist during initial place and route. When restoring the
true functionality, the arcs C to Z and D to Y are disabled
(set_disable_timing) so that only true paths are considered
for proper timing and power optimization and evaluation.
• All pins are set up in a higher metal layer (here M6 or M8) to
enable lifting and routing of wires in the BEOL. The dimen-
sions and offsets for the pins are chosen such that they can
be placed onto the tracks of the respective metal layers—this
helps to minimize the routing congestion.
• The correction cells can freely overlap with standard cells.
That is because standard cells have their pins exclusively in
lower metal layers, whereas correction cells neither impact
those layers nor the device layer. We implement custom
legalization scripts accordingly. These scripts further prevent
different correction cells from overlapping with each other.
• The buffer cell BUFX2 is leveraged for power and timing
characteristics for the correction cells. We can refrain from
detailed library characterization since the correction cells
only implement some BEOL wires.
D1
D2
C Z
D Y
Y D
C Z
S2
S1
FEOL FEOLBEOL
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Our correction cells, in conceptional view (a) and
layout view (b). For (a), dashed arrows indicate the mislead-
ing arcs for initial place and route, whereas regular arrows
represent the true paths implemented later by re-routing. It
is important to note that re-routing is always between pairs
of correction cells. In (b), a correction cell with its pins in
M6 is seen overlapping with an inverter (pins in M1).
• To enable proper ECO optimization, the correction cells are
set up for load annotation at design time. That is required
to capture the capacitive loads of (i) the wires running from
the correction cells to the sinks and (ii) the sinks themselves.
It is important to note that re-routing (to restore the original
netlist) is always between pairs of correction cells, not only within
one cell. This implies that an attacker may know the scheme of
correction cells (i.e., true paths are between C and Y and between
D and Z), but she/he cannot derive the original netlist from that
knowledge alone. Instead, she/he has to identify the correct pairs
of cells, which is hampered by two facts: (i) retracing the BEOL-
centric correction cells in the FEOL is challenging, and even when
the attacker succeeds, then (ii) the distances between correct pairs
of cells are randomized, based on the erroneous netlist being placed
and routed. For (ii), recall that this misleads any state-of-the-art
proximity attack to begin with (Sec. 3). For (i), note that the pins
of correction cells are in higher layers (M6 or M8) whereas the
layout is split after lower layers, necessitating some wiring paths in
between. Hence, the dangling wires related to the correction cells
are unlikely to be as distinct as in Fig. 3(b) but rather spread out.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Experimental Setup
Test cases:We evaluate our proposed defense on 12 benchmarks,
seven from the ISCAS-85 suite and five from the industrial IBM
superblue suite [14]. We convert the superblue benchmarks (initially
defined in Bookshelf format) to Verilog files using scripts from [15].
Setup for layout evaluation: Our techniques are implemented
for Cadence Innovus 16.15 using custom in-house TCL scripts, which
impose negligible runtime overheads. We leverage the Nangate
45nm Open Cell Library [16] with ten metal layers. Correction cells
are set up in M6 for ISCAS-85 and in M8 for superblue benchmarks.
Conservative PPA analysis is carried out for the slow process corner
and a supply voltage of 0.95V. We ensure that all layouts are free of
congestion by choosing appropriate utilization rates. We allow PPA
budgets of 20% for ISCAS-85 and 5% for superblue benchmarks.
Setup for security evaluation: In line with the prior art, we
assume that the attacker has access to the FEOL layout and the
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technology libraries, but she/he cannot access working chips yet
to be manufactured. We utilize the network-flow attack [5] for
ISCAS-85 benchmarks and the routing-based attack crouting [6]
for superblue benchmarks.4 The OER and HD are computed using
Synopsys VCS upon applying 1,000,000 test patterns for each netlist;
functional equivalence is validated using Synopsys Formality.
Comparative study: Besides the correction cells, we also imple-
ment another set of custom cells, called naive lifting cells. These
cells are implementing the same principle of lifting wires, but with-
out inducing erroneous connections. We apply these cells using our
flow on original layouts to obtain a baseline called naive lifting.
The protected layouts of [5, 12] have been made available to us as
DEF files. Since there are no definite indications of the split layer in
the respective publications, we average the security metrics (CCR,
OER, and HD) for splitting after layers M3, M4, and M5 respectively.
Open source: We make our correction cells and naive lifting
cells available to the community, along with the protected layouts,
in [11]. We also provide our DEF splitting and conversion script.
5.2 Security Evaluation
Protection of the placement: Recall that our scheme is based
on randomly modified netlists, leading to erroneous FEOL lay-
outs which are corrected only in the BEOL. It is intuitive that the
distances of truly connected gates will be randomly distributed,
thereby misleading proximity attacks. In fact, we achieve a signifi-
cant increase of the distances alongwith awidely varied distribution
(Fig. 4 and Table 1). This finding is corroborated by the superior
resilience for ISCAS-85 benchmarks (Tables 4 and 5); see further
below for a comparative study on placement protection.
Protection of the routing: Recall that placement-centric pro-
tection schemes are offset by routing, especially once splitting is
conducted after higher metal layers (Sec. 2), rendering routing-
centric schemes more promising in that context. Figure 5 contrasts
the contribution of each metal layer towards the wirelength for
superblue benchmarks. For original layouts, the majority of wiring
is found in the lower metal layers which provides significant lever-
age for an attacker. As for naively lifted layouts, the wiring is more
evenly distributed across the metal layers which may help to pro-
tect the layouts. However, it is important to note that naive lifting
cannot help dissolve the distances between connected gates (Fig. 4).
In contrast, our scheme holds the majority of wiring in the higher
layers and dissolves the true connectivity in the FEOL, offering less
leverage for an attacker and enabling splits after higher layers.
We observe that our scheme is significantly more effective than
naive lifting in terms of increasing vias/vpins in higher layers (Ta-
ble 2). Additional vias/vpins induce more nets in the BEOL, render-
ing routing-centric attacks more challenging. For example, taking
M5 as the split layer, our scheme increases the vias V56 by 30.65% on
average when compared to naive lifting. We observe accordingly
that the crouting attack [6] is impaired by larger lists of candi-
dates and more vpins (Table 3). Recall that even seemingly small
increases in those metrics imply a large-scale, polynomial increase
of complexity—our scheme increases both metrics compared to
original as well as lifted layouts.
4For the latter, note that the advanced attack as proposed by Magaña et al. in [7] has
not been available to us at the time of writing. Also, note that we have to split the
DEF files obtained by Cadence Innovus and convert them to .rt/.out files using custom
scripts [11], as the scripts provided by Magaña et al. are tailored for academic routers.
Table 1: Distances between connected gates (in microns).
Benchmark Layout Mean Median Std. Dev.
superblue1
Original 14.31 2.85 54.84
Lifted 14.37 2.92 54.83
Proposed 198.46 48.41 318.88
superblue5
Original 14.38 2.99 49.16
Lifted 14.39 2.99 49.17
Proposed 244.73 96.9 328.84
superblue10
Original 12.66 2.73 49.59
Lifted 12.71 2.8 49.58
Proposed 254.06 71.03 372.07
superblue12
Original 19.06 3.18 75.37
Lifted 19.08 3.23 75.37
Proposed 263.21 81.28 395.26
superblue18
Original 12.91 2.54 41.74
Lifted 12.93 2.54 41.74
Proposed 208.47 119.51 244.81
In short, our scheme (i) keeps the major share of wirelength
in the BEOL (Fig. 5) and (ii) significantly increase the via counts
(Table 2), all while inducing misleading routing in the FEOL.
Comparison with the prior art:We contrast the resilience of
our scheme against various prior art in Tables 4 and 5. As expected,
the original layouts are most prone to proximity attacks: on average
94% CCR and 7%HD can be achieved when running the attack of [5].
Selective gate-level placement perturbation as proposed in [5] offers
only a marginal improvement over unprotected layouts, with an
attacker making 92% correct connections and experiencing 15% HD.
Sengupta et al. [8] proposed four different protection strategies, and
while the CCR is reduced to 63% on average, it should be noted that
those techniques can become impractical to protect larger designs
(in terms of excessive PPA overheads). Swapping of block pins
as proposed in [3] is also limited; the attacker can still correctly
infer 87% of the missing system-level interconnects. The scheme
proposed by Wang et al. [12] reduces the CCR to about 72%. More
recently, Feng et al. [9] proposed a routing-based scheme which
can reduce the CCR significantly to about 21%.
Our scheme offers the best protection as it can reduce the CCR to
the ideal value of 0%—none of the nets randomized in the FEOL are
correctly inferred by an attacker. We attribute this superior result
to the holistic mitigation of placement and routing hints. Besides
CCR, our scheme also achieves an OER of ≈100% (only [12] reports
similar numbers). Finally, our average HD is 40.4% which is another
significant improvement over the prior art.
Besides the crouting attack, Magaña et al. [6, 7] also proposed
routing-centric protection schemes. As discussed, a key metric for
their evaluation is the number of vias/vpins. In Table 6, we compare
their most recent results [7] with ours, whereas we set up the
correction cells for lifting wires to M8. Since our scheme increases
the via count in those higher layers to a much larger degree, we
believe that it is more resilient than that of Magaña et al.5
5.3 Layout Evaluation
We estimate the area cost with regard to die outlines. That is because
our correction cells do not impact the device layer, but theymandate
re-routingwhichmay require larger outlines tomaintain DRC-clean
layouts. In practice, however, we obtain no area cost at all (Fig. 6).
5Recall that the attacks in [6, 7] do not provide actual netlists, hence we cannot compare
for related metrics such as CCR, OER, and HD. Besides, note that Magaña et al. [7]
cautioned on wire lifting, since routers may be misguided by lifting which, in turn,
can impact PPA. Our scheme exhibits reasonable PPA cost despite lifting (Sec. 5.3).
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Figure 4: Distances between drivers/sinks for original (a), naively lifted (b), and our layouts (c), for superblue18 benchmark.
Table 2: Comparison of additional vias for naively lifted layouts and our proposed scheme over original IBM superblue layouts.
For a fair comparison, we randomize the same set of nets. We ensure zero die-area overhead and all layouts are DRC-clean.
Benchmark Nets I/O Pins Util. Layout V12 V23 V34 V45 V56 V67 V78 V89 V910 Total Vias
superblue1 873,712 8,320/13,025 69
Original 3,016,748 2,334,923 664,292 239,550 170,423 82,762 56,170 34,164 16,249 6,615,281
Lifted (%) 0.10 0.56 1.29 2.44 3.45 3.28 1.69 0.68 0.37 0.61
Proposed (%) 2.1 4.13 10.82 18.38 29.86 31.79 34.2 27.3 40.93 5.87
superblue5 754,907 11,661/9,617 77
Original 2,430,541 1,866,252 553,843 217,394 157,046 75,306 50,970 30,714 15,227 5,397,293
Lifted (%) 0.1 0.8 1.8 3.3 4.9 5.0 2.4 1.2 0.7 0.9
Proposed (%) 3.2 7.3 12.9 23.9 40.0 55.1 59.5 51.3 67.6 9.2
superblue10 1,147,401 10,454/23,663 75
Original 3,871,474 3,048,375 875,305 329,549 238,533 111,507 76,885 45,408 22,721 8,619,757
Lifted (%) 0.04 0.49 1.11 2.11 3.02 3.18 1.49 0.53 0.24 0.52
Proposed (%) 2.06 6.29 12.43 22.92 32.27 55.22 57.16 59.29 69.74 7.90
superblue12 1,520,046 1,936/4,629 56
Original 5,368,332 3,995,438 1,130,079 445,635 316,038 141,141 100,358 55,097 31,301 11,583,419
Lifted (%) 0.03 0.16 0.42 0.87 1.33 1.37 0.58 0.31 0.2 0.2
Proposed (%) 1.59 6.99 19.09 30.56 30.19 34.67 22.92 30.93 -1.19 7.78
superblue18 670,323 3,921/7,465 67
Original 2,298,823 1,686,525 480,099 179,088 121,277 51,187 28,950 18,345 4,319 4,868,613
Lifted (%) 0.05 0.55 1.56 3.69 5.62 5.82 3.10 0.72 1.09 0.73
Proposed (%) 1.73 5.98 10.50 20.03 39.24 61.11 90.08 71.08 287.84 7.34
Figure 5: Contribution of the metal layers to wirelength for
randomized nets in superblue benchmarks.
Since nets are lifted to BEOL layers (M6/M8) and rerouted, we
naturally observe some increases in wirelength. These overheads,
however, translate only to some degree to power and delay cost. On
average, 11.5% and 10% power and delay cost arise for the ISCAS-85
benchmarks. For the superblue benchmarks, average overheads are
3.5% and 2.7% for power and delay, respectively. We found that
these overheads are 3.4% and 2.6% higher than those induced for
naive lifting. In this context, recall that our scheme outperforms
naive lifting as well as prior protection schemes in terms of security.
Note that most prior studies do not report on detailed layout
evaluation and PPA results. In a recent study by Sengupta et al. [8],
however, the authors report on PPA results for their protection
scheme. We contrast their results with ours in Fig. 6; our scheme
induces on average lower overheads on all area, power, and delay.
Table 3: Results for crouting attack [6]. Comparison of vpins
and candidate list size (E[LS]) as a function of bounding box.
N/A denotes attack failures.
Benchmark Layout #VPins E[LS] for Bounding Box15 30 45
superblue1
Original 73,110 4.63 13.25 23.46
Lifted 73,810 4.65 13.27 23.47
Proposed 75,754 4.69 13.46 23.83
superblue5
Original 67,194 4.86 13.99 24.87
Lifted 67,676 4.85 13.9 24.73
Proposed N/A N/A N/A N/A
superblue10
Original 155,180 5.05 14.54 25.75
Lifted N/A N/A N/A N/A
Proposed 157,106 4.88 14.1 25.07
superblue12
Original 127,112 4.84 13.85 24.45
Lifted 127,610 4.83 13.79 24.35
Proposed 165,106 6.29 17.95 32.04
superblue18
Original 50,026 3.76 10.86 19.17
Lifted 51,970 3.87 11.09 19.54
Proposed 54,154 4.26 12.22 21.74
6 CONCLUSION
Multiple studies recently questioned the security of split manufac-
turing. In this work, we raise the designer’s game to protect against
malicious FEOL parties. Our idea is to randomize the functionality
and connectivity in the netlist, place and route that misleading
design, and restore the true functionality only through the BEOL.
We contrast our scheme to recent state-of-the-art defense tech-
niques, while leveraging both placement- and routing-centric at-
tacks. We observe that our protected layouts are significantly more
resilient while exhibiting reasonable PPA cost, even on large-scale
industrial benchmarks. Another contribution in our scheme is that
we readily support splitting after higher layers (e.g., after M6),
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Table 4: Comparison with placement perturbation schemes. The metrics for our scheme are averaged for splitting after M3,
M4, and M5; the metrics for the prior art are quoted. All values are in percentage. The attacks are based on [5].
Benchmark
Original Layout Placement Perturbation [5] Placement Perturbation [8] Proposed
CCR OER HD CCR OER HD Random G-Color G-Type1 G-Type2 CCR OER HDCCR CCR CCR CCR
c432 92.4 75.4 23.4 90.7 98.8 41.8 68.1 84.4 89.8 78.8 0 99.9 48.4
c880 100 0 0 96.8 15.8 1.2 56.1 84.3 81.4 78.5 0 99.9 43.4
c1355 95.4 59.5 2.4 93.2 94.5 8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 40.1
c1908 97.5 52.3 4.3 91 97.8 17.7 70.8 83.9 81.9 79.9 0 99.9 46.2
c2670 86.3 99.9 7 86.3 100 7.5 52.8 66.6 66.9 56.5 0 99.9 39.8
c3540 88.2 95.4 18.2 82.6 98.8 27.9 44.8 40.3 41.7 42.4 0 99.9 47.9
c5315 93.5 98.7 4.3 91.1 98.7 12.5 49.5 54.1 50.1 56.2 0 99.9 38.3
c6288 97.8 36.8 3 97.6 74.2 16.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 31.6
c7552 97.8 69.5 1.6 97.9 81.7 3.1 56.9 48.9 53.3 48.5 0 99.9 27.8
Average 94.3 65.3 7.1 91.9 84.5 15.1 57.0 66.1 66.4 62.9 0 99.9 40.4
Table 5: Comparison with routing perturbation schemes. The setup is the same as in Table 4.
Benchmark
Original Layout Pin Swapping [3] Routing Perturbation [12] Synergistic SM [9] Proposed
CCR OER HD CCR OER HD CCR OER HD CCR OER HD CCR OER HD
c432 92.4 75.4 23.4 92.5 N/A 39.8 78.8 99.4 46.1 N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 48.4
c880 100 0 0 85 N/A 26 47.5 99.9 18 N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 43.4
c1355 95.4 59.5 2.4 86 N/A 40 77.1 100 26.6 N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 40.1
c1908 97.5 52.3 4.3 86.2 N/A 25 83.8 100 38.8 N/A N/A N/A 0 99.9 46.2
c2670 86.3 99.9 7 N/A N/A N/A 58.3 100 14 33.3 N/A 20.5 0 99.9 39.8
c3540 88.2 95.4 18.2 83.5 N/A 50 77 100 36.1 11.5 N/A 35 0 99.9 47.9
c5315 93.5 98.7 4.3 92.5 N/A 41 74.7 100 18.1 14.9 N/A 23.6 0 99.9 38.3
c6288 97.8 36.8 3 N/A N/A N/A 80.9 100 42.1 33.1 N/A 40.6 0 99.9 31.6
c7552 97.8 69.5 1.6 91 N/A 48 73.9 100 20.3 21.3 N/A 24.7 0 99.9 27.8
Average 94.3 65.3 7.1 88.1 N/A 33.4 72.4 99.9 28.9 20.8 N/A 28.9 0 99.9 40.4
Table 6: Comparison with [7] w.r.t. additional via count. Lay-
outs are split after M6 and true connectivity restored in M8.
Benchmark
Routing Blockage [7] Proposed Scheme
∆+V67 (%) ∆+V78 (%) ∆+V67 (%) ∆+V78 (%)
superblue1 23.28 65.07 36.32 49.22
superblue5 12.74 24.01 55.12 59.47
superblue10 64.85 84.09 62.09 73.12
superblue12 16.99 35.59 79.34 70.59
superblue18 24.73 58.66 61.87 124.16
Average 28.52 53.48 58.95 75.31
Figure 6: Comparison with [8] on ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
thereby limiting commercial cost. In future work, we seek to pro-
tect against further threats such as insertion of hardware Trojans
and to formulate strategies towards “provably secure SM.”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to Jeyavijayan (JV) Rajendran (Texas A&M)
for providing the network-flow attack and protected layouts of [5,
12]. This work was supported in part by the Center for Cyber
Security (CCS) at NYU New York/Abu Dhabi (NYU/NYUAD).
REFERENCES
[1] C. McCants, “Trusted integrated chips (TIC),” Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity (IARPA), 2011. [Online]. Available: https://www.iarpa.gov/
index.php/research-programs/tic
[2] D. Forte, S. Bhunia, and M. M. Tehranipoor, Eds., Hardware Protection through
Obfuscation. Springer, 2017.
[3] J. Rajendran, O. Sinanoglu, and R. Karri, “Is split manufacturing secure?” in Proc.
Des. Autom. Test Europe, 2013, pp. 1259–1264.
[4] B. Hill et al., “A split-foundry asynchronous FPGA,” in Proc. Cust. Integ. Circ.
Conf., 2013, pp. 1–4.
[5] Y. Wang, P. Chen, J. Hu, and J. J. Rajendran, “The cat and mouse in split manu-
facturing,” in Proc. Des. Autom. Conf., 2016, pp. 165:1–165:6.
[6] J. Magaña, D. Shi, and A. Davoodi, “Are proximity attacks a threat to the security
of split manufacturing of integrated circuits?” in Proc. Int. Conf. Comp.-Aided
Des., 2016, pp. 90:1–90:7.
[7] J. Magaña, D. Shi, J. Melchert, and A. Davoodi, “Are proximity attacks a threat
to the security of split manufacturing of integrated circuits?” Trans. VLSI Syst.,
vol. 25, no. 12, pp. 3406–3419, 2017.
[8] A. Sengupta et al., “Rethinking split manufacturing: An information-theoretic
approach with secure layout techniques,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Comp.-Aided Des.,
2017, pp. 329–336.
[9] L. Feng et al., “Making split fabrication synergistically secure andmanufacturable,”
in Proc. Int. Conf. Comp.-Aided Des., 2017, pp. 313–320.
[10] Y. Wang, T. Cao, J. Hu, and J. J. Rajendran, “Front-end-of-line attacks in split
manufacturing,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Comp.-Aided Des., 2017, pp. 321–328.
[11] (2018) DfX Lab, NYUAD. [Online]. Available: http://sites.nyuad.nyu.edu/dfx/
research-topics/design-for-trust-split-manufacturing/
[12] Y. Wang, P. Chen, J. Hu, and J. Rajendran, “Routing perturbation for enhanced
security in split manufacturing,” in Proc. Asia South Pac. Des. Autom. Conf., 2017,
pp. 605–610.
[13] K. Xiao, D. Forte, andM.M. Tehranipoor, “Efficient and secure split manufacturing
via obfuscated built-in self-authentication,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Hardw.-Orient. Sec.
Trust, 2015, pp. 14–19.
[14] N. Viswanathan et al., “The ISPD-2011 routability-driven placement contest and
benchmark suite,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Phys. Des., 2011, pp. 141–146.
[15] A. B. Kahng, H. Lee, and J. Li, “Horizontal benchmark extension for improved
assessment of physical CAD research,” in Proc. Great Lakes Symp. VLSI, 2014, pp.
27–32. [Online]. Available: http://vlsicad.ucsd.edu/A2A/
[16] (2011) NanGate FreePDK45 Open Cell Library. Nangate Inc. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nangate.com/?page_id=2325
